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This May, The 8th triennial Japan‐Paciﬁc Islands Leaders MeeƟng (PALM8 ) will be held in Fukushima. 
It will be hosted by the Japanese government and co‐chaired by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and 
Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi of Samoa. MariƟme security will likely be a major agenda 
item.  
 
Last year, two study groups made up of Japanese parliament members were convened. One was on 
Paciﬁc Island Countries (PICs), and the other on ocean policy. The parliament members were keen to 
learn about current PICs mariƟme security issues and Chinese expansion in this region. Subsequently, 
they submiƩed a leƩer of requests about PALM8 to Japan’s Finance Minister Aso and Foreign Minister 
Kishida. These leƩers coincided with the publicaƟon of the government’s next basic ocean policy that 
emphasize mariƟme security and Prime Minister Abe’s vision of a free and open Indo‐Paciﬁc. 
 
The focus on PICs’ mariƟme security is important. Fourteen PICs have large, strategic EEZs in the Indo‐
Paciﬁc region. But the PICs have limited capacity for ocean management. Most PICs have large Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) that are hundreds or thousands of Ɵmes the size of their landmasses, and few 
ships, planes and equipment to monitor them.  
 
The PICs’ GDP‐to‐populaƟon raƟo gives an indicaƟon of their naƟonal capacity limits to manage their 
ocean resources. For example, compare Japan and Palau. The EEZ per person of Japan is approximately 
one baseball ﬁeld, while in Palau it is 1000 ﬁelds. In Japan the GDP is $1 million per square kilometer of 
EEZ, while in Palau it is $400.  
 
AddiƟonally, large secƟons of the Paciﬁc Ocean are lawless spaces for a range of transnaƟonal crimes, 
such as human traﬃcking, illicit drugs, Illegal ﬁshing, and illegal immigraƟon. Weak mariƟme security in 
the PICs, a by‐product of weak economic security, undermines the whole Indo‐Paciﬁc. While there is 
sincere respect for the decades of the Australian government’s Paciﬁc Patrol Boat program, the majority 
of PICs received only a single patrol boat. That, combined with limited human resources and 
large operaƟon costs, leaves mariƟme security vulnerable. All of these factors are compounded by the 
emergence of China as a major stakeholder in the Paciﬁc Ocean. 
 
In 2008 Admiral Timothy J. KeaƟng of PACOM warned that the PLA had an interest in dividing the Paciﬁc 
Ocean between China and the United States. Although it made the news, few took his warning seriously. 
One excepƟon was Mr. Yohei Sasakawa, Chair of the Nippon FoundaƟon, a Japanese NGO. He wanted to 
make a Japanese contribuƟon to peace focused on the Micronesian region where Japan has deep Ɵes, 
and contribute to strengthening the Japan‐US alliance,  
 
Over the past decade, the Nippon FoundaƟon has not only provided patrol boats to Micronesian 
countries, but also established a dialogue between Micronesian countries, as well as with the United 
States and Australia. In January 2018, the Nippon FoundaƟon handed over the sub‐regional mariƟme 
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coordinaƟon center in Palau. This center originated out of a concept by Dr. Sam Bateman and Dr. 
Anthony Bergin of Australia. 
 
The reason a Japanese NGO (rather than the government) has taken the iniƟaƟve on mariƟme 
security in the Paciﬁc is because of ArƟcle 9 in the Japanese consƟtuƟon. Although Japan relies 
heavily on mariƟme transportaƟon, aŌer the war Japan did not have an oﬃcial mariƟme security 
role beyond the defense of Japan.  
 
The Nippon FoundaƟon (originally named the Japan Shipbuilding Industry FoundaƟon) took the 
iniƟaƟve by launching a surveillance system for the Malacca Straits. There are also two Japanese 
mariƟme law‐enforcement agencies: the Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA) and the Japan Coast 
Guard. These two mariƟme law‐enforcement agencies were established by the United States aŌer 
the war. US ﬁsheries experts even suggested that the Japanese government should establish 
the Ministry of Fisheries to enhance its ability to manage its own ﬁsheries industry. As a result, JFA 
now takes leadership on regional ﬁsheries organizaƟons and has more than 40 patrol boats. Since 
2014, one of them (500 tons) has been dispatched to the Palau EEZ where illegal Vietnamese ﬁshing 
boats (so called “Blue Boats”) have been discovered. 
 
The United States Paciﬁc Command (PACOM) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
have  welcomed Japan’s NGO iniƟaƟves for the mariƟme security of the western Paciﬁc, 
although the Kevin Rudd government of Australia (Prime Minister 2007‐2010; 2013), and especially 
the Royal Australian Navy, have had strong reservaƟons. This situaƟon changed with the Tony 
AbboƩ government (Prime Minister 2013‐2015).  As for the Japanese government, aŌer ten years of 
warnings from Admiral (ret) KeaƟng, Foreign Minister Kono ﬁnally made a comment that Japan faces 
the Paciﬁc Ocean and China does not. This was in response to a statement by Xi Jinping, President of 
China, where he menƟoned that China and the United States could divide the Paciﬁc Ocean.  
 
Fourteen PICs have large, strategic EEZs in the Indo‐Paciﬁc region. The Indo‐Paciﬁc as an area has 
been menƟoned by Abe as an area of conﬂuence ‐ a joining of waters. Such an idea has a deep 
history. Three thousand years ago a seafaring Austronesian‐speaking people connected these two 
oceans. These people are the ancestors of the people of the Paciﬁc Islands. They formed an 
extensive exploraƟon and trade network. They brought the banana from Asia to Africa, and the 
sweet potato from South America into the Paciﬁc Islands. The Austronesian peoples voyaged back 
and forth over hundreds and thousands of kilometers by canoe, moving people, animals, 
plants, knowledge and new concepts. 
 
Many scholars have argued that small islands have fragile resources and the survival of 
the communiƟes living on these small islands depends on external exchange networks linking them 
with outside groups. Those islands that do not have these links disappear. Messages from the past 
have important lessons for communiƟes today. PICs could develop natural resources in cooperaƟon 
with other countries such as Japan, rather than restrict themselves. For example, New Zealand's 
most successful ﬁsheries company is owned by Maori iwi Ngai Tahu and shared with a 
major Japanese ﬁshing company to develop its capacity and enter into the global market. Economic 
security in the PICs is criƟcal for a free and open Indo‐Paciﬁc. 
 
If mariƟme security is a main agenda item for PALM 2018 as expected, then Japan should invite 
the United States and France who have jurisdicƟon over a massive EEZ in the Paciﬁc. However, any 
successful Indo‐Paciﬁc strategy will not be centered around countries like Japan, the United States, 
France, Japan Australia, or India, who have large navies or mariƟme forces. The fourteen PICs 
should not only have an acƟve role but should help lead the development of any Indo‐Paciﬁc 
strategy.  
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